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RECENT CASE NOTES
from substitution of its own findings on appeal. 2 1 Thus protraction of equity
cases may be prevented with or without statutory authority to make independent
findings of fact on appeal as a basis for final judgment; in some states this
has been extended to actions at law.2 2 But when state constitutions guarantee
the right of jury trial it is essential that such procedure be restricted to cases
where the jury was waived or the trial court was authorized to direct a
verdict.2 3
Indiana has provided for weighing evidence on appeal, 24 but exclusion
of cases "triable to a jury" from operation of the statute is held to make the
provision applicable to equity suits only.2 5 Under further practice statutes,20
without violation of the jury trial guarantee, the Indiana courts have per-
mitted reversal without remanding for new trial when all the facts necessary
to a complete and final determination of the cause are in the record either
upon special findings, 2 7 agreed statement,2 8 documentary evidence,2 9 or by
answers to interrogatories submitted to the jury,S0 where justice does not
require a new trial.
The decision of the Court in the instant case is entirely in accord with the
spirit of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It should be the policy of
the law to end litigation, but with justice for all litigants. The substance of
a trial by jury consists in the determination of issues of fact raised by com-
petent evidence produced in support of the allegations only where the jury
might reasonably find for the party who produced that evidence. There is no
denil of the right of jury trial where the court is entitled to direct a verdict
on the failure of the litigant to produce sufficient evidence to raise and support
a material issue of fact. Nor is there such a denial where the Court has
reversed only to the extent of the liability admitted by the pleadings. It is
useless multiplication of judicial work to remand for a new trial where the
trial court had failed to direct a verdict which should have been directed.
J. W. C.
BILLS AND NOTES--PRESENTMENT OF A DOMICILED NOTE-PAYMENT TO ONE
OTHER THAN THE HOLDER AS CONSTITUTING DIscHARGE-Defendant company
2 1 Mirich v. T. J. Forschner Contracting Co. (1924), 312 II. 343, 143
N. E. 846.
2 2 Donohue v. Conley (1927), 85 Cal. App. 15, 258 P. 985; In Hebert v.
New Orleans Public Service (1929), 10 La. App. 341, 119"So. 575, the Louisiana
court held that it is the appellate court's duty to render such judgment as,
in its opinion, should have been rendered by the court in the first instance,
whether the case turns upon an issue of fact or of law.
23 See note 21.
24 1933 Burns 2-3229.
25 Mills v. Thomas (1924), 194 Ind. 648, 144 N. E. 412. See note in 1933
Burns 2-2502; 2-2503; 2-3234. 8 Indiana L. J1. 195, concerning the inherent
power of appellate courts to make final disposition of equitable actions.
27Bedford Quarries Co. v. Thomas (1902), 29 Ind. App. 85, 63 N. E. 880.
28 Haskell & Barbour Car Co. v. Prezezdziankowski (1908), 170 Ind. 1, 83
N. E. 626. In Sherrod v. Lawrenceburg School City (Ind., 1938), 12 N. E.
(2d) 944, the Supreme Court reversed judgment for $648, with instructions
to enter judgment for appellant for $855, and costs, the facts not being in
dispute.
29 G. W. Conwell Bank v. Kessler (1932), 94 Ind. App. 256, 180 N. E. 625.
80 Catterson v. Hall (1906), 37 Ind. App. 341, 76 N. E. 889.
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made certain bearer notes specifying on their face that they were "payable
at the City Trust Co." and were secured by collateral deposited with the trust
company "under the provisions of a certain trust indenture between the maker
hereof and the trustee." The trust agreement provided that the maker "will
pay to the trustee, for the holders of the notes" the obligation in six monthly
installments. Defendant delivered the notes to the trust company which in
turn sold them. Plaintiff's decedent purchased one, but as no record was
kept of the purchasers, defendant had no knowledge that the note was held
by the decedent. Defendant paid over the amount of the notes to the trust
company at maturity and the collateral was released, but plaintiff never
collected from the trust company. Thirty-six days thereafter the trust com-
pany went into receivership. Defendant pleads payment as a defense to the
present action and appeals from an adverse judgment. Held, reversed. Plain-
tiff was charged with notice of the terms of the trust deed, the language
thereof being sufficient to establish the trust company agent of plaintiff to
receive payment. Commercial Credit Co. v. Seymour Natl Bank (Ind. App.
1938), 15 N. E. (2d) 118.
The court was silent as to the applicability of the Negotiable Instrument
Law,1 but there would appear to be little question but that the note in suit
met all the formal requirements of the act and should have been governed by
its relevant provisions. 2
Several significant and interesting problems are suggested by the case,
although not very fully discussed by the court. There are two of particular
importance: first, what are the legal consequences occasioned by making an
instrument payable at a specified place; and second, when can a note be dis-
charged by payment to one not in possession thereof?
The literal application by most courts of the provision that presentment is
not necessary to charge the primary party3 has preponderated over the
plausible analogizing of the domiciled note to the ordinary check. Section 87
of the act, providing that making an instrument "payable at a bank is equiva-
lent to an order to the bank to pay the same," would have made the analogy
seem rational, but the courts have said this was "only intended to settle the
vexed question of the bank's right, without specific authority to pay such an
instrument and charge the same to the principal debtor."4 Also it might have
been argued as a matter of commercial policy, there should be no difference
in treatment of domiciled notes and checks. Neither was functionally designed
1 Burns 1933, Section 19-101 ff.
2The only factor which possibly might destroy the negotiability of the
instrument is the reference on its face to the extrinsic trust deed. Did this
make the promise conditional within the meaning of Section 1 (2) ? It is
almost unanimously ruled that such language as this is not strong enough
to qualify the absolute promise to pay. See Aigler, Conditions in Bills and
Notes (1928), 26 Mich. L. Rev. 471, where the author states that only where
the promise is expressly made conditional on the face of the instrument or
the instrument itself is expressly made subject to another writing should the
instrument be held non-negotiable. See Titlow v. Hubbard (1878) 63 Ind. 6,
where a "subject to another contract" provision made the note non-negotiable.
8N. I. L. Sec. 70.
4 Binghampton Pharmacy v. First National Bank (1915), 131 Tenn. 711;
176 S. W. 1038; Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Epstin (1929), 151 S. C.
67, 48 S. E. 713; Bedford Bank v. Acoam (1890), 125 Ind. 584, 25 N. E. 713.
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to be a circulating medium, and, perhaps, the same legal consequences should
be imposed on the holder of a domiciled note who fails to make a diligent
presentment as on the dilatory check-holder.5 However, it is the almost
universal rule that payment to the bank or other place at which a note is
made payable does not of itself constitute a discharge and the risk of future
solvency of the recipient is on the maker and not on the procrastinating
holder.6
Conceding that the letter of the law and possibly some phase of business
policy supports this principle when no special factors are present, except that
the note is made payable at a specified place, should the same result obtain
under circumstances similar to those in the instant case? Even though the
maker was technically the primary party, the plaintiff here, in all probability,
actually looked primarily to the credit and financial responsibility of the trust
company, the same as a check-holder who has delayed an unreasonable time
in making presentment is compelled to look to the financial stability of the
drawee bank.7 It is submitted that nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Law
would have precluded the decision from being put on the ground that the
plaintiff was obligated to make a diligent presentment.8 However, no mention
was made of this possibility, the court apparently being content with the
agency rationale.
No court has ever held that the mere fact an instrument is made payable
at a specified bank makes the bank agent to receive payment for the holder. 9
Of course, it is clear that payment to an agent of the holder is effective, but
the burden of proving the agency relationship is upon the one who asserts its
existence.1O A debtor who makes payment to one not in possession of the
instrument evidencing the debt acts at his peril,"1 but the fact of non-possession
is not conclusive as to the lack of authority in the party receiving said
payments.12
The court in the instant case concedes the soundness and controlling effect
r Section 186 provides that a check must be presented within a reasonable
time or the drawer will be discharged to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay.
6 Glatt v. Fortman (1899), 120 Ind. 384-, 22 N. E. 300.
7 Probably the plaintiff was a customer of the trust company and had never
heard of the maker when he bought the note. He knew that the trust company
held the security for the note; he knew the obligation would be paid to the
trust company, and it would be the trust company who would be his immediate
payor. Surely it was the stability of the trust company that loomed brightest in
the mind of the plaintiff, and that is perhaps the reason he delayed three years
in making presentment for payment.
8 Sec. 70 is probably intended only to control the allegations and defenses
of the pleadings.
9 Dillingham v. Parks (1902), 30 Ind. App. 61.
'0Tappan v. Morseman (1865), 19 Iowa 499; Hull v. Smith (1896), 3
Kans. App. 685, 44 Pac. 908; Rhodes v. Belcher (1899), 36 Oregon 141, 59
Pac. 117; Hoffmosten v. Black (1908), 78 Ohio St. 1, 84 N. E. 423.
11 Mindet Cork Corp. v. Geipp (1935), 278 N. Y. S. 231, 154 Misc. 798;
Springfield National Bank v. Jeffers (1929), 266 Mass. 248, 165 N. E. 474.
12 See Antioch College v. Carroll (1890), 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 220, where
Taft, J. said, "If express authority be given to collect, the absence of the
note cannot affect it and any circumstances tending to show express authority
to collect might, if strong enough, overcome the presumption of a want of
authority from the absence of the note."
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of these principles, but it proceeds to announce the proposition that an agency
is created between the trust company and the holder as a matter of law if a
note contains a reference to a trust deed (sufficient to charge the holder with
notice thereof)13 wherein it is provided that the "maker will pay to the trustee
for the holder of the notes."
The most obvious ground on which one could reasonably dissent from the
court's conclusion concerns how precise and specific the terms of the trust deed
should be as respects the designation of the trustee as agent of the holder. In
view of the vague and indefinite wording of the deed in the instant case, one
eminent authority would probably doubt the correctness of the court's decision
on this point.14 That writer points out that this is especially true when con-
sideration is given to the fact that the language of the trust deed is more
truly that of the one relying on the agency because he was primarily instru-
mental in the drafting of the deed. He had ample opportunity to insist on
the insertion of provisions that would have clearly and unequivocally estab-
lished an agency and thereby allowed him to pay in safety.
It must be admitted that the court in saying that the trust company was
agent for the holder was merely stating a legal conclusion, but the difficulty
arises as to whether there could be selected from the great mass of agency
rules and principles any which would even give the conclusion a logical
form.1 5 Nevertheless, can the result by the court be championed as one con-
ducive to the facilitation and security of business transactions? It is submitted
that it can.
The regal position of the holder in due course pervades the entire field of
the law of commercial paper. It is the constant reiteration of the courts that
good business policy demands that he be protected. Isn't it just as supportable
a theory that the needs of commerce would be subserved if the payor in due
course also received the blessings of the courts? It is a reasonable assumption
that, if the courts adopt a policy favorable to security of payment transactions,
debtors will be encouraged to pay more promptly; holders, pleased by the
prompt payment, will be ready to buy more paper; the payor having greater
assurance that he is quit of his obligation, will be less hesitant about entering
new transactions; in short, commercial machinery would be greatly expedited.
Taking cognizance of the particular credit machinery involved in the
principal case, one of the important factors on which the successful operation
1aThe holder was charged with notice in the instant case apparently
under the doctrine stated in National City Bank v. Kirk (1922), 85 Ind. App.
120; 134 N. E. 772, to the effect that a note and a contemporaneous written
instrument intended to control it, made between the same parties, should be read
and considered together as if one in form, where a controversy arises between
the original parties or those standing in their place or chargeable with notice
of such contemporaneous agreement.
The trust deed in the instant case may have been recorded thousands of
miles from where the plaintiff purchased his note, but plaintiff is still charge-
able with notice.
14 See Aigler, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 232. In Connell v. Kankamma (1917),
164 Wisc. 471, 159 N. W. 927, the court stated that the trustee must be specially
authorized to receive payment "by clear and satisfactory evidence."
15 Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 Yale L. J. 859. Neither does there
appear any element of estoppel in the case as there were in Noble Co. Bank v.
De Pew (1918), 68 Ind. App. 406, 120 N. E. 605.
RECENT CASE NOTES
of it depended was that payment to the trustee should constitute a discharge.
Obviously, the primary function for which the set-up was designed was the
making available of more credit at lower costs, and the shifting of financing
risks to those organizations better equipped to handle them. Assuming that
the attainment of these objectives is promotive of general economic welfare,
the decision seems to be a desirable one inasmuch as it brings the law into
conformity with business needs. J. M. C.
BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS-APPEALABLE ORDER.-The Federal Power Com-
mission instituted an investigation of the ownership, management, and control
of respondent utility corporations. Respondents were directed to make their
books and papers available for examination by the commission's represent-
atives. After a preliminary investigation the commission issued an order
setting a date for hearing to gain information on the question of control and
organization. In response to respondents' contention that the Commission
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and of some of the persons, the order
was adjourned without day. During proceedings before the Commission to
determine its jurisdiction, respondents objected to evidence, alleging that it
was not relevant to the issue of jurisdiction but pertained to the subject matter
for which the original investigation was instigated. Upon the objections
being overruled respondents obtained a decree from the Circuit Court of
Appealsl directing the Commission that evidence be restricted to the issue of
its jurisdiction. On appeal, held, there was no reviewable order before the
court; therefore it had no jurisdiction to enter the decree. Federal Pover
Commission u. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1938), 304 U. S. 375, 58 S. Ct. 963.
The statutes concerning independent federal administrative agencies have
provided that a person aggrieved by "an order" may appeal to a designated
court. 2 This does not mean that any order regardless of its character may be
immediately reviewed by the courts. The functional aspect of the 6rder-
whether administrative, legislative, or judicial-is an important factor when
judicial review is sought. Where purely ministerial or administrative action
of the commission is involved an appeal cannot constitutionally be allowed.S
On the other hand, the doctrine that legislation may not be reviewed by the
courts until there is a case or controversy seems to apply to administrative
orders. Thus, orders which promulgate general rules and regulations having
characteristics "of a statute may be reviewed when a particular individual
seeks to avoid compliance.4
1 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Federal Power Commission (1938), 94
F. (2d) 943.
2Interstate Commerce Commission, 28 U. S. C. A. see. 41, subd. 28 "any
order;" Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 825L; Federal Trade Com-
mission, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 45 (c); National Labor Relations Board, 29
U. S. C. A. sec. 160 (f) "final order;" Securities and Exchange Commission,
15 U. S. C. A. sec. 78y.
3"To admit the existence of a direct reviewing power in the courts would
violate the constitutional dogma of separation of powers," Dickinson, "Judicial
Control of Official Discretion" (1928), 22 American Political Science Review
275 at 282.
4 See "Appealability of Administrative Orders," 47 Yale L. Rev. 766. The
argument that a commission's action is strictly legislative would be met by
saying that it is invalid as an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The
